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Abstract 
This paper continues a research agenda started in 2016 with an aim of more realistic 
acquisition program scheduling estimates, especially for the development (SSD) phase. 
This, our third look at the scheduling problem, starts with a discussion of scheduling data, 
and how that data could be applied to help the DoD address this challenge. This section 
includes ideas on how to use acquisition data for the scheduling problem. Next, we present 
a case study that is the result of field interviews with senior DoD leaders. Finally, we present 
a discussion on using the system performance as a metric. 
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Introduction 
Weapons system development projects are infamous for exceeding time and cost 
limitations. Often the reaction to this notoriety is changes at the policy level of acquisition. 
However, the problem may well lie somewhere else. This paper, like the two preceding 
papers in this series, suggests we may well be “lookin’ … in all the wrong places” (to 
paraphrase an old country song1) for the causes, because the causes may well lie inside the 
project and therefore not be readily addressed by policy changes.  
While cost, performance, and schedule are critical variables in any acquisition 
program, Congress, the media, and policymakers generally focus on cost, with little attention 
devoted to the issues of schedule. Moreover, although the DoD has engaged in significant 
efforts to develop methods for realistic acquisition cost estimates, it has paid considerably 
less attention to schedules—their estimates and execution. To emphasize the challenge of 
schedules, Figure 1 provides a macro level view of the schedule problem. Over the past 20 
years, Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), as reported in Selected Acquisition 
Reports (SARs), averaged schedule overruns of more than 24 months. Schedule overruns 
occur for many reasons and this study examines some of those reasons. 
 
Figure 1. Sum of Schedule Overruns, 1998–2017 (Months) 
We use a multi-faceted approach to examine weapons systems development 
scheduling to assess the current state and contributing causes of schedule estimating 
methodologies and suggest different ways to accomplish this difficult process. The 
overarching research question is as follows: 
                                            
 
 
1 From the words to a song written by Wanda Mallette, Bob Morrison, and Patti Ryan, and recorded 
by American country music singer Johnny Lee in June 1980. 
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What analytical techniques and approaches can be applied to schedule 
development/analysis to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of schedule 
estimating and execution? 
As long ago as 1988, Morris and Hough were critical of the practice of project 
management: 
Curiously, despite the enormous attention project management and analysis 
have received over the years, the track record of projects is fundamentally 
poor, particularly for the larger and more difficult ones. Overruns are 
common. Many projects appear as failures, particularly in the public view. 
Projects are often completed late or over budget, do not perform in the way 
expected, involve severe strain on participating institutions or are cancelled 
prior to their completion after the expenditure of considerable sums of money. 
In fact, project management in general, and DoD project management in particular, 
has been dealing with these problems described by Morris and Hough for decades. We 
hope to inform these problems because, “when problems persist, practitioners and scholars 
are getting something wrong” (Christensen & Bartman, 2016).  
This paper is the third in a series of investigations into alternatives to the way we do 
schedule estimation today and builds on the research agenda proposed by Franck et al. in 
2016 and furthered in Franck et al. in 2017 (Franck, Hildebrandt, & Udis, 2016; Franck, 
Hildebrandt, Pickar, & Udis, 2017). We start with a discussion of scheduling data, and how 
that data could be applied to help the DoD address this challenge, and how system 
dynamics can inform. Next, we present a case study that is the result of field interviews with 
senior DoD leaders. Finally, we present a discussion on using parametric analysis.  
The Dynamics of Project Management 
The concept of time in project management can be divided into two steps: estimating 
task duration and building the schedule. Both processes require technical expertise and 
management savvy. First the technical process of estimating the duration of the project task 
must be determined. Once duration is established, the management process of project 
sequencing and scheduling must be defined.  
Estimating Activity Duration 
Surprisingly, little information is available in the literature on the “how” to estimate the 
elements of a schedule—the task duration. While the major defense contractors have formal 
in-company processes, little formal literature is available on the specifics of task estimation. 
Further, most available information on estimating task duration is found in project 
management textbooks, but even then, the specifics are scarce.  
The PMBOK (Project Management Body of Knowledge) lists five methods for 
estimating project activity duration. These methods include (Project Management Institute 
[PMI], 2017): 
 Expert Judgment  
 Alternatives Analysis  
 Published Estimating Data  
 Project Management Software  
 Bottoms-up Estimating 
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Expert judgment acknowledges that technical and engineering experts should be 
able to estimate the effort necessary to accomplish tasks and translate those estimates to 
duration. This assumes the chosen experts have significant experience in the execution of 
those tasks, and are therefore competent to judge time required (Hughes, 1996). 
Alternatives analysis recognizes that activities or tasks can be accomplished in 
different ways—alternatives. These different ways include defining different techniques, 
differing levels of resources, and using different machines. 
Published estimates are databanks that gather resources measures. These 
measures include hourly rates by skill level, acknowledged production rates for various 
development, and manufacturing activities. In most cases, this data is available internal to 
the organization. However, there are data companies that track and report this data. An 
example is the IEEE-USA Salary & Benefits Survey. This data is often available for different 
locations in the United States as well as worldwide.  
Project management software is not really an estimation method. Instead, it provides 
a means to identify and organize information necessary for resource estimates.  
Finally, an engineering or bottoms-up estimate is a comprehensive schedule (and 
cost) process that starts at the work package level and aggregates costs to build a complete 
estimate. Bottoms-up estimates are necessary when schedule activities cannot be 
accurately estimated using another technique. As the name implies, bottoms-up estimates 
start at a level of activity or task that can be confidently estimated. The activities are then 
rolled-up to the required level. These estimates are extremely work intensive but are also 
the most accurate.  
Other recognized methods include parametric techniques. A parametric or top-down 
estimate builds an activity estimate for the development project from historical data 
comparing variables through a statistical relationship. All the methods listed are used to 
estimate the length of time each of the activities or Work Breakdown Structure tasks lists. 
“Simply stated, the duration of an activity is the scope of the work (quantity) divided by a 
measure of productivity” (Hendrickson, Martinelli, & Rehak, 1987, p. 278). 
Thus, activity duration estimation establishes the actual time required to complete 
discrete tasks in an overall project, while project scheduling fixes the start and end dates, as 
well as execution approaches of the project. Once the overall schedule is established, 
management activities driven by either time and/or resource constraints will determine the 
actual execution of the project (Schwindt & Zimmerman, 2015). The analogy that comes to 
mind is that of an orchestra. The individual instruments (and of course, the musicians) are 
the discrete tasks of the project. The orchestra leader is the project manager, and the music 
score is the “plan” the orchestra leader uses to execute the “project.” Building on this 
information, the next step in this effort is to identify schedule data that can be used to 
augment these estimating activities. 
Schedule Data  
While there is significant information available on DoD procurements, the 
overwhelming majority of that information is on cost. In order to effectively examine project 
schedules, we must be able to better understand those schedules. It is common knowledge 
that weapons system development projects overrun their schedules. However, we need to 
be able to determine what causes schedule overruns, as well as an actual measure of the 
development time.  
Data for this research was obtained from the Defense Acquisition Management 
Information Retrieval (DAMIR) database, a repository for, inter alia, the DoD Selected 
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Acquisition Reports (SARs). The SAR is a summary of the acquisition data of selected Major 
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs). Table 1 provides a list of delay factors, as well as 
maximum and minimum delays as reported in the SAR during the period 1997–2017.2   
Table 1. Delay Factors, Maximum Delays, and Minimum Delays, 1997–2017 








Administrative changes to schedule 
including updates to APB, ADM changes, as 
well as changes resulting from Nunn-
McCurdy processes and program 
restructuring 
460 168 5 
Technical 291 60 4 
Testing delays 283 66 1 
Delay in availability of key 
capabilities/facilities (launch vehicle/testing 
facilities/IOT&E units) 
3 13 6 
Budget/Funding Delays 52 43 1 
Delays attributed to the Contractor 50   
Delays because of Rework 16 4 1 
External events such as inflation, 
earthquakes, labor strikes, etc.  
(Force Majeure) 
4 4 1 
Delays due to Contracting/Contract 
Negotiation/Award delays 
29 27 1 
Actuals (updating previously reported dates 
to actual occurrence) 
172 13 -39 
These delay factors suggest program managers (PMs) should plan for the time 
necessary to deal with oversight, information reporting and both the time takes, as well as 
the impacts of decisions—internal and external to the program. As the GAO pointed out in a 
2015 study, the program office overheads associated with administrative activities added, on 
average, two years to complete: 
Programs we surveyed spent on average over 2 years completing the steps 
necessary to document up to 49 information requirements for their most 
recent acquisition milestone. This includes the time for the program office to 
develop the documentation and for various stakeholders to review and 
approve the documentation. 
                                            
 
 
2 The data described are from an unpublished study by the author of the delay factors for DoD 
program 1997–2017. The study is an initial attempt at quantifying schedule delays in program 
execution with the intent of using those delays to better inform project planning. 
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Figure 2 provides a trend line and forecast of the delays identified. Using this data, 
the forecast total delay hours across all programs in 2019 would be 712 hours, and in 2020 
that forecast would increase to 729 hours. 
 
Figure 2. Trend Line Showing Forecasted Schedule Increases 
Applying the Data 
Our previous paper introduced the rework concept, shown in Figure 3. As noted, the 
CPM/PERT approach to scheduling precludes the use of data at the program schedule 
level. And, while some companies track task estimation data, that data is often proprietary 
and more focused on technical process estimation (Godlewski, Lee, & Cooper, 2012). 
 
Figure 3. The Rework Cycle 
The basic assumption that work proceeds as planned in the network from start to 
finish is naïve at best (Franck et al., 2017). System dynamics can account for the feedback 
that results from decisions made in the execution of a project. A project network using 
CPM/PERT techniques depends on each task being completed in the defined order 
established. While most PMs attempt to maintain that order, the reality of dynamics 
intervenes. That reality means that network analysis cannot capture the progress of a 
project (Williams et al., 1994).  
A tool used in system dynamics to capture cause and effect is a causal map. The 
causal map becomes a tool used for the development of a model of the delay factors 
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identified. Figure 4 is an initial causal map capturing some of the identified factors in 
weapons system program schedule delays. The factors shown are a subset of those 
identified for brevity in this paper.  
Delay factors plus the effects of rework, decision wait time, tasks start delay, and 
other disruptions result in the PM (or PMO) recognizing a schedule problem (delay in the 
critical path). Invariably, the PM must take action to attempt to return the project to the 
equilibrium expressed as being on schedule. Thus, the PM could approve overtime, 
reschedule, or take some other mitigation. The pressure to get back on schedule is driven 
by many factors including cost considerations, pressure from the oversight organizations, 
and in weapons systems development, the necessity of delivering capability to the 
warfighter in the most efficient time. Regardless the reason, the PM “does something.” The 
plus and minus signs indicate the effect of the actions taken.  
 
Figure 4. Delay Factors Triggers for Project Delays 
(Howick, 2003) 
A project is a dynamic system with feedback loops and, invariably, decisions taken to 
address one problem have an impact on, or create new problems. For example, approving 
overtime does initially address schedule issues as more work is being done in shorter 
periods. However, a recognized problem of overtime is fatigue. Fatigue causes workers to 
make mistakes, and those mistakes result in having to redo the work, thus perpetuating 
problems that were thought solved.  
Similarly, hiring more workers causes more problems. Assuming the new workers 
have the requisite skills, they need to be trained/acclimated to the actual project situation. In 
the Mythical Man Month, Brooks (1995) explained how this concept works in software 
development. In reality, it is universal.  
Finally, while many of the delay factors identified from the SAR analysis can be 
explained in Figure 4, others require further examination. One of the biggest challenges is 
the area of decisions, both internal and external. The internal decisions drive many of the 
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actors discussed above. However, the PM must also deal with external decisions that can 
eventually impact the development. 
Figure 5 is a notional graphic that represents a generic decision cycle in the context 
of the rework cycle. While the results of this data analysis included rework, the majority of 
the identified delay factors were decision focused. Those decision centric factors included 
represent this decision cycle. The notation is shown between the work to be done and work 
completed boxes because many of the decisions identified occur outside the project 
manager’s purview. The exogenous factors identified cause either reactions to those factors, 
or force other internal decisions. While not normally a part of the rework cycle, we suggest 
that a formal appreciation of a decision cycle, and the time it takes for decisions to be made 
both internal as well as external to the program management cycle, must be considered. 
 
Figure 5. Notional Decision Cycle Added to Rework Cycle Diagram 
Conclusion 
This section continued the discussion on using system dynamics to better 
understand, plan, and execute defense acquisition programs. This section presented 
schedule information gleaned from Selected Acquisition Reports, and suggested a model to 
show how that information can be best understood in the context of the decisions necessary 
to model weapons system acquisition programs. To be clear, we are not advocating to 
replace the CPM/PERT methods used today. At best, system dynamics is an adjunct to 
those methods in use. Instead, we suggest that we should recognize the dynamics at play in 
any weapons system development, and once recognized, use the appropriate tools to better 
our execution.  
No program manager sets out to overrun a schedule; “However, clients increasingly 
value not only cost and schedule control but cost and schedule certainty” (Godlewski et al., 
2012, p. 18). Those clients for defense acquisition products seek certainty as well, both in 
cost and schedule. It is no secret that current methods for estimating and executing 
schedule are insufficient. In fact, certainty is one of the potential benefits of this examination 
of schedule factors. Project certainty starts in effective schedule planning by using the right 
tools. 
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F-35 Case Study3 
Much has been written about the F-35 program, in many venues. Defense 
acquisition professionals know a lot about “what” has happened. “How” and “why” it has 
happened is less clear. Our last essay (Franck, Hildebrandt, Pickar & Udis, 2017) undertook 
an inquiry as to the “hows” and “whys” of this case. We asked how a program that traces its 
lineage to the Common Affordable Lightweight Fighter became the F-35—which is not very 
common (Bogdan, 2012), definitely not lightweight, of debatable affordability (see GAO, 
2017; Capaccio, 2018), and arguably not a fighter (Airpower Australia, 2017). 
The publicly-available literature was not terribly enlightening, although a few 
interesting clues were discernible. We closed with an intent “to learn more in future inquiries” 
(Franck et al., 2017, p. 420). Since then, the field interview method has brought new insights 
to many aspects of the F-35 program. 
Given space limitations, we concentrate on some useful hypotheses we’ve 
gleaned—the assessment of which is for further inquiry. These hypotheses4 concern 
program management, technology and engineering, and the lure of new technologies. 
Careful readers will note that they are not mutually exclusive and are interrelated in a 
number of ways. 
Program Management 
The management narrative can be organized as poor program structure from the 
start: an underequipped and over-burdened program office—all of which enabled bad 
decisions. 
Program Structure 
The program turned out to be well-designed to fail. Basically, Lockheed-Martin (LM, 
the prime contractor) had considerable discretion and control over a highly complex program 
with a vague set of requirements. Moreover, the incentive structure was not well designed 
(“poor” according to at least one authority). This produced a Principal-Agent problem (e.g., 
Kreps, 1990, Chapter 16) with the Principal (DoD) unable to fully monitor the agent’s (LM’s) 
behavior, or to incentivize good behavior. One result was a strained relationship between 
LM and DoD (“worst I’ve ever seen”; Bogdan, 2012). 
The program strategy reflected a number of optimistic framing assumptions. These 
included joint programs saving money, plus new, but untried, methods expected to 
significantly reduce risk and time. This latter set included the assumed benefits of recent 
acquisition reforms and better simulation methods expected to reduce flight testing. All this 
led to an aggressive schedule—involving tight timelines with a high degree of concurrency 
accepted a priori (Blickstein et al., 2011, p. 37).  
When these assumptions were not borne out, schedules stretched out and costs 
grew. The RAND Root Cause Analysis, for example, concluded “optimistic cost and 
schedule estimates” constituted a major cause of program difficulties (Blickstein et al., 2011, 
p. 37).  
                                            
 
 
3 We are greatly indebted to a highly-placed, well-informed DoD official for many of the insights that 
underpin this section of our paper. Chatham House Rule applies. 
4 Although readers will likely not agree with all the details, few, if any, will be surprised. 
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Program Office 
The F-35’s DoD management team was assigned a task that included serious 
complexities in both technical and management dimensions. Moreover, the management 
difficulties included coordination of 11 stakeholders (three U.S. and eight international) with 
varied operational needs while complying with the U.S. ITAR (International Trade in Arms) 
regime. 
Additionally, cascading effects of program difficulties made the work even more 
complex. One example was weight growth early in the program (precipitated in part by 
entering development with a slender weight growth margin), which necessitated a larger 
engine, which in turn necessitated a major redesign of the fuselage to accommodate the 
larger engine (Blickstein et al., 2011, p. 53)—with one major result being cost growth and 
schedule delay. The acquisition strategy turned out to be something of a “house of cards.” 
Given its highly complex and demanding mission, the F-35 Program Office was 
woefully underequipped at crucial junctures. Requirements discipline in the formative period 
has been characterized as “weak” and unable to deal effectively with a number of changes 
internal to the program (e.g., tech insertions, revised development plans) and external (e.g., 
threat evolution). In addition, there were, at times, mismatches between Program Office 
needs and personnel skills aboard. 
Some tools of program management were inadequate—particularly for schedules. 
From a program management perspective, schedule management tools proved hard to use, 
not well tied to resource use, insufficiently flexible to account for risk and program 
perturbations, and not supported with data from historical experience. As program difficulties 
arose, there was no credible means available to estimate schedule implications.  
These are, of course, difficulties that afflict any defense acquisition program. 
However, new, complex, difficult, advanced systems like the F-35 suffer more. Another 
difficulty was rotating new program executive officers (PEOs) every few years. Accordingly, 
both the opportunity and incentive to reorient the program were in very short supply. This 
particular pattern was broken in 2012 with an indefinite-term PEO. 
In addition, as problems continued, the Program Office was subject to a rather 
onerous oversight regime, with attendant political pressures and constraints. The one-year 
F-35B probation period is one example (Franck et al., 2012, esp. pp. 57–59). 
Program Execution: Bad Decisions 
The factors cited above facilitated bad decisions. The flawed assumptions that 
underpinned the acquisition strategy did not receive sufficient scrutiny (perhaps related to 
leadership tenure). In an atmosphere of pervasive optimism, relatively pessimistic 
assessments (such as the CAIG report in 2001) had little apparent effect on program 
management (Blickstein et al., 2011, p. 37). Requirements remained in some degree of flux 
well into the program life, with corresponding effects on program stability.  
Heavy reliance on test data (e.g., reliance on simulations and test data from non-
scale airframes) greatly delayed the test program when those presumptions proved 
inaccurate. 
The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display (HMD) was a major technical advance—with 
great promise but high risk and no guarantee of success. However, a natural programmatic 
hedge, head-up display (HUD), was cancelled early in the program. This meant that lags in 
HMD development became a major threat to program success (Bogdan, 2012). 
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Program Office personnel clung closely to a commonality standard among the three 
models, with cost growth and delays associated with fixing one model’s problems among all 
three models. (This seems to make sense if the F-35 is one unified program; less so, if there 
are three programs with commonalities.5)  
Technology and Engineering 
The optimism that set the theme for the management strategy also pervaded the 
technology assumptions. There was a strong proclivity to underestimate the difficulties and 
risks. While, for example, there was a fair amount of experience with stealthy aircraft 
designs within the U.S. defense industrial base, the F-35 was nonetheless a major leap 
forward. As RAND’s Root Cause Analysis noted, the basic technical requirements were very 
demanding. This is illustrated in Table 2. Given the high degree of commonality specified for 
the F-35, if one model needed to meet the design objectives in the table, all models need to 
achieve those objectives. It took considerable ingenuity to design an airplane whose 
morphology accommodated all these requirements (Blickstein et al., 2011, esp. p. 37). 
Table 2. Required Features for F-35 Design 
(Adapted from Blickstein et al., 2011, Table 4.6, p. 49) 
 STEALTH STOVL SUPERSONIC 
Engine Inlets Small Large Specific shapes 







Specific (speed regime 
transitions) 
Materials Stealthy airframe 
skin 
Light skin for vertical 
landing 
Strong skin (speed regime 
transitions) 
Accordingly, there was little margin for error or unexpected difficulties; one example 
was the 6% allowance for increased weight. That reserve was exceeded early in the 
program, which necessitated a major redesign exercise (Blickstein et al., 2011, pp. 47, 53). 
Given the demanding nature of the original design and slender margins for error, 
there was nonetheless a definite willingness to push the technical envelope. Thus, for 
example, the Helmet Mounted Display (discussed above) was a major technical advance—
with a natural hedge (HUD) discarded early.6 
There was likewise a propensity to trust new and promising, but not fully validated, 
engineering methods. These included computer simulations substituting much of the testing 
normally accomplished in the air. The result was a test program generally behind and in a 
catch-up mode (e.g., see DOTE, 2016, esp. p. 31). 
                                            
 
 
5 LtGen. Bogdan (2012) eloquently stated the separate-programs perspective. 
6 Reasonable people can disagree as to whether this is a management issue, technical issue, or both. 
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The Attraction of New Technologies 
Technology insertions occurred with some frequency during the F-35 development 
program. These included the Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) and the 
Helmet-Mounted Display. ALIS seems to have been regarded as merely the logical 
extension of onboard aircraft diagnostics (Steidle, 1997, p. 9). However, more than a 
decade later, problems with ALIS were (rightly) viewed as an existential threat to the entire 
program (Bogdan, 2012). 
Likewise, the evolution of the F-35 from an affordable, limited-capability companion 
for the F-22 (inter alia) to a “situational awareness machine” seems to be related to some 
major advances in sensor capabilities that the F-35 program adopted. (It’s also true that the 
stakeholders were involved: “JAST … was … designed to have the smallest possible sensor 
suite and be dependent on external information sources … [But] most of the export 
countries did not have (those sources) in their inventory” and the F-35 became a battlefield 
information producer [Keijsper, 2007, p. 135]).  
Such initiatives, taken in isolation, were undoubtedly viewed as sensible at the time. 
However, the cumulative effect of a series of sensible decisions can be a horrible end result.  
The last word on the new technologies and platform performance issues might well 
come from General Deptula (2016): 
Current systems are largely expected to operate in a semi-autonomous 
fashion, with a basic level of collaborative engagement with other platforms. 
These shortcomings place pressure on individual assets to possess 
numerous internal capabilities. The complexity inherent to this approach 
drives lengthy development cycles, which in turn leads to requirement creep, 
time and cost overruns, and delays in capability. (pp. 6–7; emphasis added) 
This looks like an indirect reference to the F-35 we’re getting. 
Some Questions for Further Investigation 
1. Can an acquisition program schedule become self-stretching? A simplified 
version of this hypothesis goes something like this. System complexity entails 
a lengthy development program. Over time, various technical improvements 
present themselves—some of which are adopted. These technical insertions 
(even if done well) nonetheless add to system complexity or estimated 
program schedule (or both). This cycle is summarized in Figure 6. 
While this influence diagram seems plausible, the strength of these connections and 
their total effects on program schedules are subjects for further inquiries. 
- 484 - 
 
Figure 6. Self-Stretching Acquisition Program Schedules? 
2. To what extent do weak schedule estimation and management tools affect 
program performance? There are excellent reasons to believe that 
scheduling estimates are sometimes not realistic. What schedule 
management tools do program managers and program offices lack? How can 
those gaps be addressed? 
JCIDS Manual (CJCS, 2015, p. A-9) recommends tradeoffs among system cost, 
performance, and schedule. Program managers have reasonably good cost estimation 
tools, reasonably good indicators of system performance, but not good ways to estimate 
schedules—especially if the original program experiences requirements growth.  
This question offers some scope for gap analysis—to be investigated through case 
studies and interviews with subject matter experts. 
Measuring System Performance7  
Updating combat system performance measures is important for at least two 
reasons. First, a better understanding of combat capability in the information age could 
significantly improve defense policy and planning. Second, a credible (preferably scalar) 
measure of combat capability could contribute much to schedule estimation—through better 
schedule-estimating relationships.  
We’ve chosen to start with air-air combat systems. In a previous paper (Franck et al., 
2017, esp. pp. 423–425), we explored a Lanchester aimed-fire model with various 
complications: stealth and command control, in addition to lethality and relative numbers. 
Results were interesting, but just a start.  
Air combat in the near future will involve weapons committed from various types of 
platforms. Accordingly, we extend our previous model to include engagements “called in” 
                                            
 
 
7 This particular discussion has been abridged to fit the Proceedings’ space limits. A more detailed 
version is available on request at cfranck215@aol.com. 
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from other platforms. One variant along this line is using non-stealthy aircraft (such as F-15s 
and B-52s) as weapons carriers whose targets are identified and assigned by fifth-
generation aircraft—such as the F-35.  
Accordingly, some aircraft (“scouts,” S) will use their situational awareness 
capabilities to acquire hostile assets and then assign other aircraft (“weapons carriers,” W) 
to engage them.8 This assignment entails a useful networking capability. In this concept of 
operations, the shooter aircraft are primarily weapons carriers—and consumers of offboard 
sensors.  
A Lanchester-Type Variant for Contemporary Air Combat9  
Consider a stylized air battle scenario about one decade in the future:  
During the opening days, fighting focuses on the battle for air superiority as 
aircraft from both sides clash over contested territory. As the conflict 
continues, fifth-generation aircraft seek out, degrade, and destroy advanced 
SAMs in contested territory, creating a more moderate threat environment. 
This enables legacy aircraft to operate alongside their fifth-generation 
counterparts. (Harrigian & Marosko, 2016, pp. 7–8) 
This suggests two major changes expected in the foreseeable future. The first is 
heterogeneous air combat forces: consisting of stealthy aircraft, plus a force of “legacy” 
combatants. The initially contested airspace contains stealthy fighters, with any older aircraft 
being quickly eliminated in that area (Barrett & Carpenter, 2017, esp. p. 5). However, those 
non-stealthy platforms can actively participate as weapons launchers whose fires are 
assigned by the fifth-generation aircraft acting as scouts—or other assets with command 
control capabilities.  
Second, air combat will no longer be merely platform-on-platform engagements, but 
rather network-on-network, information-centered combat. One manifestation of this line of 
reasoning is the “kill web” concept, which features highly-networked forces with 
decentralized lethality and sensor capabilities, but most importantly decentralized decision 
making. Kill-web units take independent action, and are not “micro-managed” (Timperlake, 
2017). 
A related idea is the “combat cloud”: “a model where information, data management, 
connectivity, and command and control (C2) are core mission priorities. The combat cloud 
treats every platform as a sensor, as well as an ‘effector’” (Deptula, 2016, p. 1). In particular, 
operational decision making is spread throughout the network, with the “entire area of 
responsibility … functioning as a CAOC [Combined Air Operation Center]” (Deptula, 2016, p. 
7). 
                                            
 
 
8 Given the F-35’s limited internal weapons carriage, the role of finding hostiles and assigning others 
to engage is likely the primary role. We (Franck & Udis, 2016) have suggested “joint scout fighter” as 
a more descriptive name than “joint strike fighter.” 
9 Taylor, Vol. II (1983, Section 6.13, pp. 318 ff.) provides a rigorous exposition of a starting point for 
our model. 
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The Data-To-Decision Problem 
Kill webs and combat clouds are very promising. However, proficiency in network-
based combat is a military advantage only to the extent it leads to better decisions than the 
enemy’s (Gouré, 2018). Moreover, decentralized decision making is integral to the kill web 
and combat cloud concepts of operation. That makes achieving a reasonable degree of 
unity of effort a significant problem. 
A simple example suffices to illustrate the point. Suppose there are two targets (A, B) 
of equal value, with associated (decentralized) decision makers (DA, DB). Suppose also 
there are two remotely-located weapons available for assignment (a, b), and that probability 
of kill varies with both weapon and target, as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3. Simple Weapons Assignment Problem 
WEAPONS TARGETS 
A B 
a .9 .8 
b .7 .2 
Clearly the optimal assignment is Weapon “a” to Target “B,” and Weapon “b” to 
Target “A”—with 1.5 targets destroyed on average. However, structuring and solving such 
an assignment problem generally assumes a central authority with information that’s both 
timely and sufficient.  
In a decentralized decision mode, both Decision-Makers A & B (DA & DB) will note 
that Weapon “a” is better for his target. But there’s only one Weapon “a.” If DA happens to 
call in Weapon “a” first, then DB is stuck with Weapon “b,” and targets destroyed declines to 
1.1. (If DB calls in Weapon “a” first, then all is well, and 1.5 targets are destroyed on 
average.)  
Timperlake (2017), in fact, proposes that the DA and DB simply ask which weapon is 
best for their target. That may or may not work out well. One ACC Commander, Gen Hawk 
Carlisle, posits (take everything from) “subsurface to on orbit,” automatically piece it 
together, and “put it into the warfighter’s hands in a way that … now they become the 
decision-makers” (as cited in Church, 2016).  
Two comments: First, both perspectives assume a degree of situational awareness 
that goes beyond standard definitions such as “knowing real-time the current position, 
classification, condition and recent history of all items of military interest in both the physical 
and virtual battlespace” (Franck, 1995). Both Timperlake and Carlisle apparently assume 
that those decentralized decision makers also know target-weapons matchup characteristics 
well enough to make good choices among weapons available. This entails, inter alia, 
knowing plans (especially near future) of all relevant, friendly decision makers. 
In short, the open literature indicates that translating shared situation awareness 
through a web of decentralized decision makers to produce a reasonable approximation of 
unity of effort is not yet completely understood, let alone solved. And the Air Force Air 
Superiority Flight Plan (U.S. Air Force Enterprise Capability Collaboration Team, 2016) 
apparently shares this opinion, recommending, 
 a “data-to-decision campaign of experiments (to) examine how to fuse data 
from cloud-based sensor networks into decision quality information” (p. 7), 
 “non-tradition concepts” for Battle Management Systems (p. 8), and 
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 development of new Command Control capabilities to provide “materiel and 
non-materiel solutions (that) should provide commanders in 2030 with the 
ability to synchronize forces across domains” (p. 8). 
Assessing Air Combat Performance 
Effective air combat forces are proficient in accomplishing the following tasks—which 
are generally accomplished sequentially, with accomplishment of all of them needed to 
ensure success: 
 Cueing friendly forces of enemy activity (or early warning)—accomplished by 
assets with intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities 
 Detecting, identifying, and tracking enemy forces—accomplished by 
surveillance systems 
 Assigning forces to targets—command and control (C2) assets 
 Engagement of targets—combat platforms and associated weapons 
 Assessment of engagement results—surveillance systems 
Timperlake (2017) essays a framework for contemporary combat capability called 
“payload utility.” This is the ability to acquire, engage, and destroy targets. What’s important 
for assessing near-future air combat is that the associated tasks are assigned to an entire 
network, with individual units calling on offboard resources within the network. For example, 
a target can be cued and detected by an early-warning sensor suite; identified and tracked 
by surveillance assets; be assigned to friendly forces by C2 assets; localized by a combat 
system—which engages the target through a weapon fired by yet another system; and then 
followed by an assessment of engagement results.  
Simple models suggest that force sizes, weapons, stealth, and coordination are key 
variables in a credible measure of air combat capability. One look appears in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7. Combat Results VS. Detection and Lethality 
The figure highlights important aspects of combat capability. First is the importance 
of “matchups” such as ISR versus stealth, and weapons versus targets’ countermeasures. 
Second is that (from a Blue perspective) it’s important to find Red targets (defeat Red 
stealth) and to have weapons that can defeat Red self-protection countermeasures. These 
aren’t terribly profound insights. However, they suggest we might be better off with fifth-gen 
- 488 - 
weapons on fifth-gen airplanes than with fourth-gen weapons on sixth-gen airplanes. Finally, 
substitutions are indeed possible. For example, shortfalls in detection and tracking can be 
overcome with better weapons. 
Next Steps 
First, improve the model above to better account for the problem of coordinating a 
decentralized decision-making process. Among other things, we’re hoping that the 
recommended Air Force studies and experiments along this line will include some 
unclassified results. 
Second, try a more fine-grained approach to modeling future air combat. Agent-
based simulation might be a useful method. This would, of course, be a major effort but with 
potentially major insights. 
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